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To what extent is the way people perceive, represent, and reason about causal
relationships dependent on culture? While there have been sporadic attempts to
explore this question, a systematic investigation is still lacking. Here, we propose that
human causal cognition is not only superficially affected by cultural background, but
that it is co-constituted by the cultural nature of the human species. To this end,
we take stock of on-going research, with a particular focus on the methodological
approaches taken: cross-species comparisons, archeological accounts, developmental
studies, cross-cultural, and cross-linguistic experiments, as well as in-depth within-
culture analyses of cognitive concepts, processes, and changes over time. We argue
that only a combination of these approaches will allow us to integrate different
components of cognition, levels of analysis, and points of view—the key requirements
for a comprehensive, interdisciplinary research program to advance this field.
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INTRODUCTION
Causal cognition refers to how people perceive, represent, and reason about causal relationships,
that is, about the connection between a causing event and its effects. Grasping such relationships is
essential to people’s daily lives—for example when trying to understand the laws of nature, social
interactions with other people, or causes and treatments of illness—and hence arguably a core
concern of human cognition. But does this render cognitive engagement with causality a universal
and uniform phenomenon? While decades of research into causal cognition have helped to unravel
important principles on which causal perception, learning, or reasoning are based (for an overview,
see Waldmann and Hagmayer, 2013), the extent to which these processes and their outcomes may
depend on culture has received substantially less attention (for one prominent line of research, see
Norenzayan and Nisbett, 2000).
Here, we defend the position that people’s cultural background does affect whether and how they
engage in causal cognition: by shaping the settings in which causal cognition occurs, the manner in
which potential factors are pondered on, the selection of relevant factors from a causal field, or the
way in which such factors are linguistically expressed. Although on-going research already provides
some supporting evidence for this position, efforts need to be intensified to substantiate it. As this
poses methodological challenges, we place a particular focus on the various approaches taken, in
order to outline a research program for the investigation of cultural impacts in this domain more
generally.
Research approaches to cultural influences are necessarily pre-structured by whatever definition
of “culture” one chooses. While we have no intention of perpetuating a centuries-old debate that
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cannot, in principle, be resolved, we do consider it important
to outline what the topic does and does not include. Taking
an anthropological perspective (Bender and Beller, 2011b) and
following Tylor’s (1871, p. 1) classic definition, we understand
“culture” as including the knowledge, beliefs, capabilities, and
habits that people have acquired as members of society (for
a recent debate on the term culture, see Brumann, 1999, and
the comments to it). As this operationalization of culture
encompasses language, not only as a medium but also as a core
component, evidence of linguistic influences on causal cognition
will also be treated as relevant instances.
Based on this working definition, we first briefly describe
different methodological approaches taken to investigate the
question at stake, before explicating why we consider it
fundamental to combine these approaches in order to obtain a
comprehensive perspective on the cultural influences on causal
cognition.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES—AN
OVERVIEW
Causal cognition in a more narrow sense has been a key topic in
philosophy and cognitive psychology, and has therefore mainly
been tackled through conceptual analyses and psychological
experiments. The repertoire of possible approaches, however, is
substantially larger, ranging from ethnographic observations to
statistical analyses of linguistic data, thereby spanning a wide
spectrum of disciplines. It includes cross-species comparisons,
archeological accounts, developmental studies, cross-cultural and
cross-linguistic experiments, as well as in-depth within-culture
analyses of cognitive concepts, processes, and changes over
time.
Cross-Species Comparisons
Even if we are actually interested in those aspects of human
causal cognition that may be affected by culture and are
thus variable, an understanding of what is shared by humans
seems indispensable. One question to be asked is therefore:
Which components of causal cognition are invariant across
species, and which are distinct to humans and set them
apart from their closest phylogenetic relatives, the great apes
(Hanus et al., 2011), or other highly intelligent and social
species like crows (Taylor, 2014) or rats (Blaisdell et al.,
2006)? Answers to this question would not only provide a
baseline for further investigations, but a valuable window into
the complex interactions between changes in causal cognition
brought about by individual learning, cultural transmission, and
evolution.
As causal cognition in non-human species cannot be directly
investigated, tool use is typically taken as an indicator of causal
understanding (overview in Taylor and Gray, 2014). Comparative
research on human and non-human causal cognition has
not yet reached generally agreed-upon conclusions. Penn and
Povinelli (2007), for instance, concede in their critical review
that non-human causal cognition appears to be significantly
more sophisticated than traditional association theories of causal
learning would allow for, but they also claim that non-human
species are probably not capable of any human-like causal-logical
inferences about abstract causal relations. This conclusion is
contested now by experimental studies which demonstrate that
some of the great apes base their behavior on inferences from
causal cues and perhaps even on a deeper understanding of causal
principles (Mendes et al., 2007; Hanus and Call, 2011), and some
corvids even take hidden causal agents into account (Taylor et al.,
2012; and see Taylor, 2014).
Despite the controversy in this field, comparative research
across species remains indispensable for delineating those
components of causal cognition that are specific to humans,
and thus potentially susceptible to cultural impact, from those
that are part of our phylogenetic heritage. These attempts
need to take into account, however, that not only humans but
also many non-human species form complex societies, which
are partly based on learning and hence are able to pass on
behaviors culturally, at least to some extent (for debate on this,
see, e.g., Laland and Hoppitt, 2003; Whiten and van Schaik,
2007).
Archeological Accounts
Once we know which components of causal cognition are
specifically human, we can begin to ask questions such as:
did they emerge as a by-product of cognitive evolution, or
were they acquired during individual learning, stored and
scaffolded by cultural means? Questions like these lie in the
scope of paleontology and archeology; yet attempts to trace
the evolution of human causal cognition through archeological
records have commenced only very recently (Haidle, 2014).
Due to the sparseness of available data, such studies have
also remained largely theoretical, focusing on tool use as
indicator of causal reasoning and understanding in an even
more indirect way than the comparative psychological research
described above (McCormack et al., 2011; Taylor and Gray,
2014).
The key idea is to consider the construction of tools (the
material remains of which constitute virtually the only available
data on past human cognition and behavior) as attempts to
increase a person’s agency by solving a concrete problem.
Typically, the process of constructing and optimizing tools for
specific purposes presupposes an understanding of, or at least
experimentations on, cause-effect relations. The distance between
the perceived problem and the contrived solution has increased
continuously over the course of human evolution: from the use
of simple tools, through effective chaining for secondary and
modular tools, to composite tools, complementary tool sets, and
the highly abstract use of notional tools based on symbols (Haidle,
2014).
Although this archeological analysis, functioning as a kind of
reverse engineering, only provides us with rough estimates of
the time points in human evolution when certain components of
causal cognition must have been in place, it nevertheless helps
us to specify not only the changes that took place, but also the
processes by which they were presumably brought about, for
example, in terms of culturally relevant ontologies that underpin
and influence causal reasoning processes (Alberti and Bray,
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2009). Another example that might also provide archeological
evidence for causal reasoning is the origin and sophistication of
farming techniques, combining tool use with natural studies and
social factors (Mithen, 2007).
Developmental Studies
An alternative approach disentangling the complex interactions
between individual learning, cultural transmission, and
evolutionary influences on causal cognition is taken in
developmental psychology, where the assumption is widespread
that a child’s responses, observed in infancy, or unfolding at fixed
ages as a product of maturation, can be taken as evidence for
concepts and cognitive processes deeply rooted in phylogeny and
ontology.
Spelke and Kinzler (2007), in particular, conceptualize such
“core knowledge” as distinct domain-specific modules for
reasoning about physical, biological, and social or psychological
events. Each domain is defined by entities which have specific
causal properties, marked, for example, by the way they move:
Physical entities are set in motion by external forces, while
animates, the inhabitants of the biological world, can move on
their own initiative. The psychological/social domain, finally, is
populated by sentient agents, whose behavior is caused by mental
states such as knowledge, beliefs, goals, and intentions.
Such a priori knowledge is investigated with children who are
as young and unaffected by culture as possible, taking looking
time, and gaze direction as indicators (e.g., Sobel and Kirkham,
2006; Rakison and Krogh, 2012; for a critical position see Saxe
and Carey, 2006). Although these studies do provide valuable
data on components of causal cognition that may be universal,
respective inferences would be much stronger if they were not
tested almost exclusively in children from a Western urban
background. Drawing on broader samples not only allows for
more reliable generalizations, but may also change the very
inferences which are reached. For instance, not all generalizations
drawn from the core-knowledge approach hold cross-culturally,
as shown for the biological domain in a series of studies by Medin
and colleagues (e.g., Medin and Atran, 2004; Bang et al., 2007;
Medin et al., 2014; Ojalehto et al., 2015).
Cross-Cultural and Cross-Linguistic
Experiments
The gold standard for scrutinizing cultural influences has been
cross-cultural comparisons of participants’ assessments of causal
scenarios. One way of doing this, which aims at tapping into
perception and attribution tendencies, is by collecting verbally
expressed assessments of animated displays or vignettes that
visualize or describe causal events. While such studies are
typically alike in that they yield cultural differences, for instance
in which of the involved entities is assigned more causal
relevance, the inferences the researchers draw regarding the
underlying mechanisms diverge substantially. Morris and Peng
(1994), for instance, attribute the differences to implicit theories,
which favor a general focus on either internal or external causes
of behavior (Peng and Knowles, 2003), whereas others point at
linguistic cues and content variables as the relevant factors for
causal assignments (Beller et al., 2009; Bender and Beller, 2011a;
and see Le Guen et al., 2015).
As languages differ substantially in how they encode
information about causal relations and events (e.g., Wolff et al.,
2009; Bohnemeyer et al., 2010), cross-linguistic studies and
linguistic variations can help to uncover the role that language
may play in shaping causal cognition—not only as a medium of
culture, but also as a factor in its own right. Two sets of studies
on this question indicate that a change of the linguistic framing
can be sufficient to shift people’s attention to different aspects
of an event (e.g., from the causer to the affected object), with
consequences for memory processes, the assignment of blame,
and even the severity of punishment for human agents involved
(Beller et al., 2009; Fausey and Boroditsky, 2010; Fausey et al.,
2010).
Higher-order cognitive and behavioral differences based on
distinct causal understanding and representations have also been
tackled in cross-cultural studies (e.g., Güss et al., 2010), but
require more sophisticated tasks and designs. One approach
taken in research on complex problem solving, for instance, is
to construct microworlds in which participants are responsible
for retaining a balance between several interconnected factors
(overview in Güss and Robinson, 2014). These studies yield data
sets that tend to be richer but also more complex than simple
causal assignment tasks.
In-Depth Within-Culture Analyses
If the underlying theoretical models are sufficiently concrete to
afford experimental designs rather than the quasi-experimental
designs of cross-cultural research, or if the ethnographic
information is sufficiently detailed to warrant in-depth analyses,
it is also possible to test predictions and interpretations within
cultures and languages. In an early study of this type, the
anthropologist Kempton (1986) showed how different types of
thermostat usage can be traced back to different cultural models
of how these artifacts function. More recently, studies employing
experimental designs uncovered that different cultural models
of causal dependencies may co-exist in the same mind and are
accessed in different contexts (Astuti and Harris, 2008; Legare
and Gelman, 2008; and see Tucker et al., 2015). Likewise, linguist
Alessandro Duranti (1994) demonstrated how linguistic cues
such as ergative marking of agency may be used in diverse
contexts to emphasize or deemphasize responsibility. And also
the extent to which a property like intentionality is considered
when judging wrong-doing may depend on context (Astuti and
Bloch, 2015; Sousa et al., 2015).
A particularly detailed account of how respective information
can be gleaned from ethnographic descriptions of cultural
contexts that no longer exist—and critical remarks on the
diligence needed to assess them—is provided by Widlok (2014).
He emphasizes that culture-specific notions of time, linearity, and
sequence as well as extensions of agency and personhood are
crucial for a more thorough understanding of cultural differences
in causal cognition. The account contains a caveat on the
malleability of “culture” over time and depending on context
and perspective. This point is also emphasized by Iliev and
Ojalehto (2015), who discuss within-culture diachronic analyses
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 245
fpsyg-07-00245 February 20, 2016 Time: 18:23 # 4
Bender and Beller Cultural Constitution of Causal Cognition
as a necessary complement to cross-cultural investigations.
Specifically, they describe automated text analysis as a promising
tool to investigate how attention to, and notions of, causality
may have changed over time within a cultural/linguistic context,
thus shedding more light on the complex links between culture,
language and cognition.
THE NEED FOR AND BENEFITS OF
COMBINING DIFFERENT APPROACHES
The studies described in the previous section take radically
different methodological approaches to investigate the cultural
constitution of causal cognition, and their findings are not,
prima facie, easy to integrate. We still argue that combining
these approaches, and the insights they yield, is indispensable
for obtaining a comprehensive understanding of the question at
stake—for at least three reasons: They allow us to target different
components of cognition, to take different levels of analysis into
account, and to broaden our perspective by considering the points
of view of other disciplines.
Components of Cognition
The methodological approaches described above target partly
different components of cognition. While, for instance,
comparative research across species, and archeological
recapitulations of human evolution are both concerned with tool
use as core indicator of causal understanding in problem-solving
(Taylor and Gray, 2014), they still differ in their specific interests,
with the former focusing more on the cues assumed to facilitate
causal perception and learning (e.g., Hanus et al., 2011), and
the latter more on forward-planning and the organization of
problem-solving processes (Haidle, 2014).
More generally, the components tackled by any of these
approaches include perceptions and representation of causal
relations (e.g., Bender and Beller, 2011a; Le Guen et al., 2015;
Ojalehto et al., 2015; Tucker et al., 2015), learning processes
and outcomes (Blaisdell et al., 2006), verbal expressions and
explanations (Iliev and Ojalehto, 2015), as well as higher-
order cognitive effects on attention, memorization, and recall
(Fausey et al., 2010), categorization and inferences (Medin
and Atran, 2004), causal attributions in social interactions
(Morris and Peng, 1994), judgments of blameworthiness
and punishment (Fausey and Boroditsky, 2010; Astuti and
Bloch, 2015), problem-solving in complex situations (Güss and
Robinson, 2014), strategies on how to handle artifacts in daily
life (Kempton, 1986), and ways in which illnesses are explained
and treated (Hagmayer and Engelmann, 2014; Luhrmann et al.,
2015).
Combining the different approaches and their insights
therefore yields a much more comprehensive understanding not
only of what causal cognition may encompass, but also of the
various ways in which culture may actually influence it.
Levels of Analysis
As the various methodological approaches target different
components of cognition, they also allow different levels of
analysis to be taken into account. These levels range from a
long-term, evolutionary level (phylogenesis), through changes
over historic time (sociogenesis), to small-scale development
in infants and children (ontogenesis), and to actual cognition
(microgenesis).
These different levels of analysis can be fruitfully combined
to complement and refine each other. For instance, both the
statistical corpus-based analysis of verbal material by Iliev and
Ojalehto (2015) and the detailed conceptual analysis of old
ethnographic material by Widlok (2014) rely heavily on text,
while taking divergent approaches: one that grossly abstracts
over the topic and details of texts, and one that sees these
very factors as essential for getting to the gist. The former
(Iliev and Ojalehto, 2015) highlights the extent to which
the concern with a specific topic, the usage of respective
vocabulary, and perhaps even the conceptual ingredients
can change over (historic) time within a given population.
The detailed conceptual analysis by Widlok (2014), in turn,
pinpoints how much contextual information is actually needed
to glean valuable information from concrete descriptions
(see also Astuti and Bloch, 2015). Combining them could
therefore help to further improve them both: by giving more
precision to the statistical analysis on the one hand, and by
broadening the context for the ethnographic exploration on the
other.
Points of View
In line with the levels of analysis that the different methodological
approaches target, these approaches are also characteristic
for specific disciplinary traditions, including archeology,
paleontology, primatology, and anthropology, various
subfields of psychology (like comparative, developmental,
cognitive, and social psychology), computational linguistics,
(ethno-)linguistics, and philosophy. Half a century of efforts to
establish an integrative cognitive science may have taught
us that this is a difficult endeavor (e.g., Bender et al.,
2010; Beller et al., 2012)—but it is one that is worth the
trouble.
Engaging in successful cross-disciplinary research activities
requires a great deal of reflexivity among the scholars involved,
and both interactional expertise and epistemic awareness. The
former is the linguistic ability to engage about the practices
of another discipline without the ability to actually engage
in these practices (Collins and Evans, 2002), while the
latter is a metacognitive understanding that different research
practices carry with them assumptions about what constitutes
‘good science’ which need to be respected to enable fruitful
critical dialog between the participating researchers (Nersessian,
2015).
Combining various perspectives across disciplines is not only
a value in and of itself, but also promises greater insights
(Barrett et al., 2012; Bender et al., 2015) and even novel research
questions (e.g., Osbeck et al., 2011; Luhrmann et al., 2015;
Moya et al., 2015) that would eventually help to advance the
intrinsically interdisciplinary field of causal cognition. Exemplary
cases of such bridge-building work include, among others,
the collaborations of anthropologists and psychologists on the
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co-existence of cultural models regarding causal dependencies
(Astuti and Harris, 2008; Watson-Jones et al., 2015), on causal
reasoning in the biological domain (e.g., Medin and Atran, 2004;
Bang et al., 2007), and on explanations for disorders (Hagmayer
and Engelmann, 2014; Luhrmann et al., 2015).
CONCLUSION
Humans are inherently social and cultural beings. Their very
success as a species over time hinged on the fact that cultural
transmission dramatically propelled the learning process (Tennie
et al., 2009; Tomasello, 2014). How this distinctively human
power, in turn, impacts on the way humans perceive, represent,
and reason about causal relationships is still poorly explored.
It is thus high time for an interdisciplinary multi-level research
program that investigates the cultural constitution of causal
cognition more systematically for its various components,
on different levels of analysis, and from diverse points of
views.
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